The theorizing-theory of mind-reading development
*** Gopnik, A. and Wellman, H. (1994). The theory theory. In L. Hirschfeld and S. Gelman (eds.) Mapping the Mind, CUP.
*** Gopnik, A. (1996). The scientist as child. Philosophy of Science, 63, 485-514.
- Wellman, H., Cross, D., and Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: the truth about false belief. Child Development, 72, 655-684.
- Scholl, B. and Leslie, A. (2001). Minds, modules, and meta-analysis. Child Development, 72, 696-701. (A reply to Wellman et al., 2001.)
- Gopnik, A. and Melzoff, A. (1997). Words, Thoughts, and Theories, MIT Press.
- Gopnik, A., Glymour, C., Sobel, D., Shulz, L., Kushnir, T., and Danks, D. (2004). A theory of causal learning in children: Causal maps and Bayes nets. Psychological Review, 111, 1, 1-31.
- Carruthers, P. (2002). The roots of scientific reasoning: infancy, modularity, and the art of tracking. In P.Carruthers, S.Stich and M.Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. CUP.
- Stich, P. et al. (2002). The baby in the labcoat. In P.Carruthers, S.Stich and M.Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. CUP.
A simulationist account
*** Goldman (2006), chapter 7.
- Goldman (2006), chapters 2-4.
- Criticisms of simulationism may be found in Nichols and Stich (2003) and the papers by Gopnik and Wellman, Gopnik, and Wellman et al.
A mixed view
*** Nichols and Stich (2003), chapter 3.
- Nichols and Stich (2003), chapter 2.
Mirror neurons and “low-level simulation”
*** Goldman (2006), chapter 6.
- Numerous mirror-neuron articles referenced in Goldman (2006).
- Southgate, V., Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (in press). Does the mirror neuron system and its impairment explain human imitation and autism? In J.A. Pineda (Ed.), The Role of Mirroring Processes in Social Cognition. Humana Press.
- Numerous papers and discussion-notes posted at Interdisciplines (an on-line interdisciplinary forum hosted out of CNRS, Paris).
A modular account
*** Scholl, B. and Leslie, A. (1999). Modularity, development, and “theory of mind”. Mind and Language, 14, 131-153.
*** Scholl, B. and Leslie, A. (2001). Minds, modules, and meta-analysis. Child Development, 72, 696-701.
- Baron-Cohen, S. (1999). Does the study of autism justify minimalist innate modularity? Learning and Individual Differences, 10, 179-191.
- Goldman (2006), chapter 5.
- Currie, G. and Sterelny, K. (2000). How to think about the modularity of mind-reading. Philosophical Quarterly, 50, 145-160. [library research port]
- Modular accounts are also criticized in Nichols and Stich (2003), chapter 3.
- Barrett, C. and Kurzban, R. (2006). Modularity in cognition: framing the debate. Psychological Review, 113, 628-647.
- Carruthers, P. (2006) The Architecture of the Mind, chapters 1-3.
Mind-reading in infancy and “the curse of knowledge”
*** Birch, S. and Bloom, P. (2004). Understanding children’s and adults’ limitations in mental state reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 255-260.
*** Surian, L., Caldi, S., and Sperber, D. (2007). Attribution of beliefs by 13-month-old infants. Psychological Science, 18, 580-586.
*** Southgate, V., Senju, A., and Csibra, G. (2007). Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2-year-olds. Psychological Science, 18, 587-592.
- Onishi, K. and Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-olds understand false beliefs? Science, 5719, 255-258.
- Bosco, F., Friedman, O., and Leslie, A. (2006). Recognition of pretend and real actions in play by 1- and 2-year-olds: early success and why they fail. Cognitive Development, 21, 3-10.
- Onishi, K., Baillargeon, R., and Leslie, A. (2007). 15-month-old infants detect violations in pretend scenarios. Acta Psychologica, 124, 106-128.
- Friedman, O., & Leslie, A.M. (2005). Processing demands in belief-desire reasoning: Inhibition or general difficulty? Developmental Science, 8, 218–225.
- Bernstein, D., Atance, C., Meltzoff, A., and Loftus, G. (2007). Hindsight bias and developing theories of mind. Child Development, 78:4, 1374-1394.
- Keysar, B., Lin, S., and Barr, D. (2003). Limits on theory of mind use in adults. Cognition, 89, 25-41.
- Newton, A. and de Villiers, J. (2007). Thinking while talking: adults fail nonverbal false-belief reasoning. Psychological Science, 18, 574-579.
Autism: mind-reading and meta-cognition
*** Baron-Cohen, S. (2001). Theory of mind in autism: a review. International Review of Mental Retardation, 23.
*** Frith, U. and Happé, F. (1999). Theory of mind and self-consciousness: what is it like to be autistic? Mind and Language, 14, 1-22.
*** Nichols and Stich (2003). Pp. 178-187.
- Philips, W., Baron-Cohen, S., and Rutter, M. (1998). Understanding intention in normal development and autism. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 16, 337-348.
- Farrant, A., Boucher, J., and Blades, M. (1999). Metamemory in children with autism. Child Development, 70, 107-131.
- Blake, R., Turner, L., Smoski, M., Pozdol, S., and Stone, W. (2003). Visual recognition of biological motion is impaired in children with autism. Psychological Science, 14, 151-158.
- Ceponiene, R., Lepisto, T., Shestakova, A., Vanhala, R., Alku, P., Naatanen, R., and Yaguchi, K. (2003). Speech-sound-selective auditory impairment in children with autism: they can perceive but do not attend. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100, 5567-5572.
- Pelphrey, K., Morris, J., and McCarthy, G. (2005). Neural basis of eye gaze processing deficits in autism. Brain, 128, 1038-1048.
- Jarrold, C., Boucher, J., and Smith, P. (1993). Symbolic play in autism: a review. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 23, 281-387.
- Lewis, V. and Boucher, J. (1988). Spontaneous, instructed, and elicited play in relatively able autistic children. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 6, 315-324.
Denying introspection for attitudes (or: the priority of mind-reading over introspection)
*** Carruthers, P. (2007). The illusion of conscious will. Synthese, 96, 197-213.
*** Carruthers, P. (2008b). Cartesian epistemology: is the theory of the self-transparent mind innate? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15.
*** Carruthers, P. (forthcoming). Introspection: divided and partly eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
- Bayne, T. and Pacherie, E. (2007). Narrators and comparators: the architecture of agentive self-awareness. Synthese, 159.
- Peacocke, C. (2007). Mental action and self-awareness I . In J. Cohen and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
- Peacocke, C. (2008). Mental action and self-awareness II. In L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou (eds.), Mental Action. OUP.
- Stephens, L. and Graham, G. (2000) When Self-Consciousness Breaks. MIT Press.
- Blakemore, S. and Frith, C. (2003). Self-awareness and action. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 13, 219-224.
- Rey, G. (2008). (Even higher-order) intentionality without consciousness. Review Internationale de Philosophie.
The priority of introspection over mind-reading
*** Goldman (2006), chapters 9 & 10.
The independence of introspection from mind-reading
*** Nichols and Stich (2003), chapter 4.
The evolution of mind-reading and meta-cognition
*** Byrne, R. (1996). Machiavellian intelligence. Evolutionary Anthropology, 5, 135-143.
*** Byrne, R. (2003). Tracing the evolutionary path of cognition: Tactical deception in primates. In M Brüne, H Ribbert & W Schiefenhövel (Eds) The social brain: Evolution and Pathology. John Wiley, London.
*** Metcalfe, J. (2008). Evolution of metacognition. In J. Dunlosky and R. Bjork (eds.), Handbook of Metacognition and Learning, Erlbaum.
- Byrne, R. and Whiten, A., eds. (1988). Machiavellian Intelligence: social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes, and humans. Oxford University Press.
- Byrne, R. and Whiten, A., eds. (1997). Machiavellian Intelligence II: extensions and evaluations. Cambridge University Press.
Evolution (2): meta-cognition in animals? (or: what is genuine meta-cognition?)
*** Carruthers, P. (2008a). Meta-cognition in animals: a skeptical look. Mind and Language, 23, 58-89.
- Many papers on meta-cognitive experiments with animals, referenced in Carruthers (2008a).
- Farrant, A., Boucher, J., and Blades, M. (1999). Metamemory in children with autism. Child Development, 70, 107-131. [via research port]
- Anderson, M. and Perlis, D. (2005). Logic, self-awareness and self-improvement: the meta-cognitive loop and the problem of brittleness. Journal of Logic and Computation, 15, 21-40.
