"7.2 Correspondence theories", Haack, Philosophy of Logics.
a little bit about Russel and Wittgenstein's view and Austine's improvement. but there's no description about a really simple question to correspondence theories: how can we know a proposition or statement is correctly corresponding to something in the world? i guess Berkeley raised this doubt. what we can correlate with an impression is only another impression that cannot be the external object. this sort of worn out scepticism might be too epistemological to be included in this book, perhaps.
by the way, i suppose we may be able to exclude this scepticism by modifying our concepts of mind and reality. in order for us to insist a Berkeley style argument, we have to hold the three-notions perspective on mind, e.g., in seeing, what we see - sense datum or experience - mind representation. isn't it a cheap view? i think this is already bankrupted, but wide-spread view. should be dismissed.